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IOSCO warns post‑quantum signatures could materially slow public blockchains — Cryptopotato reports
Cryptopotato published an on‑record summary of an IOSCO technical assessment reporting that replacing ECC with large post‑quantum signatures could greatly increase per‑transaction data, reduce throughput (example: a ~90% Solana testnet drop) and raise node costs, complicating coordinated migration.
Cryptopotato published an on‑record article (Nov. 21, 2026) that reproduces and summarises findings from an IOSCO technical assessment. This report records IOSCO’s experimental results, numeric comparisons and recommendations. Independent reproduction of raw test harness data and per‑network benchmarks would require the IOSCO appendices and datasets, which are not part of the cited material.
What is established
- Cryptopotato published an article on Nov. 21, 2026 reporting IOSCO’s assessment that switching ECC to PQC signatures could slow transaction throughput, increase storage/propagation costs and push up fees for Layer 1 networks.
- Cryptopotato reproduces IOSCO's numeric comparison that a ML‑DSA‑44 PQC signature is roughly 2,420 bytes versus a typical 64‑byte ECC signature (≈35–40x larger).
- Cryptopotato reports IOSCO cited a Solana quantum‑resistant testnet where replacing ECC signatures with PQC alternatives led to an approximately 90% decline in throughput.
What remains unconfirmed
- Exact per‑network raw test harness data and replication artifacts that would allow independent reproduction of the Solana testnet throughput decline.
- Any single, published network‑specific migration plan by a major L1 or L2 to adopt PQC (no such plan is included in the cited report).
- A single dollar cost estimate for migrating major public blockchains to PQC (IOSCO documents test results but does not publish a universal economic total).
What was reported — the essentials
Source and scope
Cryptopotato published a report on Nov. 21, 2026 that summarises an IOSCO technical assessment of post‑quantum cryptography (PQC) impacts on public blockchains.
IOSCO’s assessment, as reproduced by Cryptopotato, found that some PQC signature schemes (example: ML‑DSA‑44) produce signatures around 2,420 bytes versus typical elliptic‑curve cryptography (ECC) signatures of about 64 bytes — roughly 35–40x larger.
The article records IOSCO experimental evidence from a Solana quantum‑resistant testnet in which swapping ECC for PQC signatures reportedly reduced throughput by about 90%.
- Primary reporting: Cryptopotato article (Nov. 21, 2026) that reproduces IOSCO findings.
- IOSCO material referenced: technical assessment PDF linked in the Cryptopotato article (not reproduced here).
- Scope: IOSCO framed the work as a technical risk assessment, not an immediate mandate to upgrade networks.
Confirmed developments from the report
Large PQC signatures increase per‑transaction data. The reproduced comparison (ML‑DSA‑44 ≈2,420 bytes vs ECC ≈64 bytes) is central to IOSCO’s performance concerns.
IOSCO’s experimental example: the Cryptopotato article cites a Solana testnet where throughput fell by about 90% after replacing ECC signatures with PQC alternatives.
IOSCO concluded that larger signatures and heavier cryptographic operations could increase latency, storage, propagation demands and potentially raise transaction fees on Layer 1 networks where many nodes verify each transaction.
Technical context and operational points
Cryptopotato reports IOSCO emphasises that cryptography is embedded in transaction formats and consensus rules, so adopting new signature schemes typically requires protocol changes (hard forks).
IOSCO highlights operational friction: decentralised networks depend on thousands of independent validators and node operators, so migration could be slow, uneven and risk leaving accounts or contracts vulnerable if coordination fails.
The assessment notes Layer 2 or rollup adoption of PQC alone may be insufficient if the underlying Layer 1 settlement, bridges or data‑availability layers remain ECC‑based.
- Hard fork necessity: protocol changes are usually needed to change signature formats.
- Coordination risk: many independent operators must upgrade for a smooth migration.
- Layer interplay: L2s can’t fully insulate users if L1 remains ECC.
Implications for zero‑knowledge systems
The Cryptopotato piece reproduces IOSCO’s comparison between SNARK and STARK contexts: many ZK‑SNARK systems use ECC primitives and may require redesign to replace ECC parts, while STARK-based proofs rely more on hashes and are therefore comparatively more quantum‑resistant.
IOSCO, as reported, still warns that STARK parameter choices and implementation details require careful evaluation when considering post‑quantum goals.
What the experiments show and their limits
IOSCO’s illustrative experiments, as reported, show that larger signatures and different cryptographic operations can materially affect throughput and node resource use — the Solana testnet example is cited as concrete evidence.
However, Cryptopotato and the linked IOSCO material (as reproduced) do not provide the raw test harness data or per‑network replication artifacts in the cited summary. Independent reproduction would need those appendices and datasets.
Why this matters
If PQC adoption were required broadly on-chain, the larger signature sizes and heavier cryptographic workload could increase bandwidth, storage and compute requirements for node operators, potentially raising the cost of participation and creating centralisation pressure.
Protocol designers and ecosystem stakeholders must weigh security gains against operational cost and performance impacts — tradeoffs that IOSCO highlights in the assessment reproduced by Cryptopotato.
Interpretation — what the reported evidence suggests
The IOSCO material, as summarised by Cryptopotato, suggests that straightforward replacement of ECC with certain PQC signatures can substantially degrade L1 performance and increase node resource demands.
Reported test outcomes indicate the magnitude of impact will depend heavily on signature choice, protocol transaction formats, block/throughput designs and implementation quality.
Careful, staged approaches (for example, hybrid key schemes, layered migration strategies and extensive protocol testing) are consistent with IOSCO’s recommended mitigation steps in the reproduced assessment.
Speculation and unresolved questions — labelled accordingly
Unresolved: the exact costs, timelines and implementation plans for any major network remain unconfirmed in the cited reporting; no single economic total or network migration plan is provided in the reproduced material.
Unconfirmed: whether any major L1 or L2 has committed to a specific PQC migration approach (the cited article does not report such commitments).
Potential outcomes: if node costs rise materially, some smaller validators could drop out, increasing centralisation pressure — this is a plausible effect implicit in IOSCO’s concerns but not proven by the cited summary.
Key reader questions and current status
What did IOSCO actually test and which networks were included? The Cryptopotato summary reproduces an example test (Solana) and broader technical arguments; the IOSCO PDF linked in the article is the primary technical document for further detail.
How large are PQC signatures? The reproduced example: ML‑DSA‑44 ≈2,420 bytes vs ECC ≈64 bytes (≈35–40x larger).
Can Layer 2s avoid L1 migration? IOSCO warns L2 adoption alone may leave exposure if the L1 settlement layer remains ECC‑based.
Who bears the cost? The article frames costs as distributed across node operators, wallet providers, exchanges and protocol communities, but no single economic estimate is published in the cited reporting.
- Current status: Cryptopotato’s article summarises IOSCO’s technical risk assessment; it does not report any immediate network‑level mandates or a published network migration plan.
- Next steps readers can take: consult the IOSCO PDF linked in the Cryptopotato article for technical appendices, and watch for protocol teams’ published migration proposals or testnet benchmarks.
Takeaway
On‑record reporting via Cryptopotato reproduces an IOSCO assessment that switching ECC to certain PQC signatures could materially increase transaction sizes and slow throughput, with an illustrative Solana testnet drop of ~90%.
The assessment frames these results as a tradeoff between long‑term post‑quantum security and near‑term performance/cost, and recommends careful testing, stakeholder coordination and layered migration strategies. Concrete costs, full datasets and network plans are not provided in the cited summary.
Sources & further reading
For information only. Not financial advice.